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A central problem in post-World War II
discussions of defensive military policies has
been that of &dquo;deterrence,&dquo; defined as &dquo;the
discouragement of military aggression by
the threat (implicit or explicit) of applying
military force in response to the aggres-
sion&dquo; (Snyder, 1960, p. 167). Thus de-
fined, the notion of deterrence involves the
notion of behavioral influence by commu-
nicative means; a deterrent threat is a con-
ditional threat of punishment for an action,
where both the specified action and the
carrying out of the punishment are unde-
sirable to the one who makes the threat.
The purpose of the threat is to prevent the
undesired action without actually fighting.
Deterrence is problematic because deter-
rent threats are not always successful;
many instances have been recorded in
which such a threat has been followed by
the very action it was designed to prevent.
This is simply a special case of the more
general statement that no communicative
means for influencing human behavior is
uniformly effective under all conditions.
The practical problem which arises in this
situation is: how can a government make
its deterrent threats more effective? The
scientific question which must be answered
in order to solve the problem is: what are
the factors which determine the effective-
ness of a deterrent threat?
Common sense has a ready answer: A
threat cannot be effective unless it is be-
lieved by the recipient, and it will not be
believed unless it is credible; therefore, to
be effective, a threat must be credible.
This conclusion is one of the basic assump-
tions in much of the literature on deter-
rence during the past decade. The prob-
lem of deterrence thus becomes the prob-
lem of credibility: to make a deterrent
threat more effective, it must be made
more credible. But this only pushes the
inquiry one step back. We must now ask:
how can a government make its deterrent
threats more credible? And the prerequi-
site scientific question now becomes: what
are the factors which determine the credi-
bility of a deterrent threat?
Once again, common sense has an an-
swer : a threat will be credible if there is
reason to believe that the one who makes
the threat is both able and willing to carry
it out. This is similar to the conditions for
credibility of any statement of intentions,
1 This article was written during my tenure
as a USPHS Postdoctoral Fellow at the Men-
tal Health Research Institute. I am especially
grateful to Karl W. Deutsch and George Lev-
inger for their extensive comments on an ear-
lier draft.
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for example, the government’s promise to
exchange metal money for each piece of
legal paper money. Thus, in order for a
deterrent threat to be credible, it must be
imbedded in a context of information con-
cerning the threatener’s ability and willing-
ness to carry it out. These are the main
factors cited in the literature which dis-
cusses the determinants of credibility (e.g.,
Schelling, 1960; Kaufmann, 1954; Snyder,
1960).
Most of the literature on deterrence has
not been based on systematic empirical
investigation, but has remained analytic,
speculative, or normative. Recently, how-
ever, Russett (1963) presented the results
of a comparative study of six historical
cases of successful deterrence and eleven
unsuccessful deterrence attempts, in which
he explored the question of what makes a
threat credible. The deterrence situations
he examined were a special class defined
as &dquo;all the cases during the last three dec-
ades where a major power ’attacker’ overtly
threatened a (minor power) pawn with
military force, and where the (major
power) defender either had given, prior to
the crisis, some indication of an intent to
protect the pawn or made a commitment
in time to prevent the threatened attack&dquo;
(p. 98). Thus, instead of ordinary self-
defense, these cases involved the defense
of a third party.
By comparing data on cases where the
deterrent threat succeeded with data on
cases where it failed, Russett arrived at a
number of conclusions concerning factors
which determine the credibility of such
threats. In the present paper, I will argue
that Russett’s data do not compel assent to
his conclusions, first because the observed
dependent variable is not a satisfactory
index of the credibility of the threat, and
second because it is not a satisfactory index
of the effectiveness of the threat. Further-
more, the assumption that the threat is a
significant deterrent factor is not required
in order to provide at least two equally
plausible alternative explanations of the
data. This situation calls for further em-
pirical research in order to choose among
alternative interpretations of Russett’s find-
ings and in order to gain more knowledge
about the determinants of national non-
aggression.
Sumrnary of Russett’s Study
The sample consisted of 17 historical
(1935-1961) deterrence situations, having
in common the following elements:
( 1 ) The &dquo;attacker&dquo; (A) and the &dquo;de-
fender&dquo; (D) were both major powers-
e.g., US, USSR, China, Germany (in sev-
eral cases, D was a coalition of major pow-
ers).
(2) The &dquo;pawn&dquo; (P) was a minor power
-e.g., Iran, Egypt, Cuba, West Berlin.
(3) At a particular time (t), A threat-
ened to attack P militarily.
(4) At some other time, either before or
after t but before A could carry out the
attack, D overtly expressed an intention to
defend P militarily (i.e., to counterattack
A if A attacked P). This expressed inten-
tion is referred to below as &dquo;D’s deterrent
threat.&dquo;
Russett stated the problem as follows:
... Propositions about factors which deter-
mine the credibility of a given threat need to
be tested systematically on a comparative basis.
... We shall explore the question of what
makes a threat credible by asking which
threats in the past have been believed and
which disregarded [p. 98].
This implies that the 17 cases were to be
subdivided into two groups according to
whether or not A believed D’s deterrent
threat, and then compared in order to see
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what factors are differentially associated
with belief and disbelief. In fact, however,
the cases were subdivided according to
whether or not A subsequently attacked P.
The implicit assumption involved here was
that if A believes D’s threat, A will not
attack P, but that if A does not believe D’s
threat, A will attack P. On the basis of
this assumption, the observed effectiveness
of D’s threat (success = A does not attack
P, failure = A attacks P) was used as an
index of its credibility (high credibility =
A believes that D is likely to carry out his
threat, low credibility = A believes that D
is unlikely to carry out his threat). In six
cases, the observed outcome was success,
while in the remaining eleven cases, the
observed outcome was failure.
Nine independent variables were ob-
served, each of which was thought to be a
determinant of credibility:
(1) Relative importance of P, defined
in terms of population size.
(2) Relative importance of P, defined in
terms of gross national product.
(3) Existence, prior to the crisis, of a
formal commitment by D to defend P.
(4) Relationship between the overall
strategic military capabilities of D and A.
(5) Relationship between the local (in
P’s territory) military capabilities of D and
A.
(6) The type of political system pos-
sessed by D (dictatorship vs. democracy).
(7) Military cooperation between D and
P, in the form of arms and advisers sent to
P.
(8) Political interdependence between
D and P.
(9) Economic interdependence between
D and P, defined in terms of the amount
of trade between them relative to the aver-
age amount of trade each has with all
other countries.
Although Russett did not specify which
component of credibility would be affected
by each of these variables, it appears that
the first three and the last three are rele-
vant to D’s willingness to carry out the
deterrent threat, while variables 4, 5, and
6 are relevant to D’s ability to carry it out.
It was assumed that A would take these
factors into account in deciding whether
or not to believe the threat. Each variable
was dichotomized, and one of the two
values was hypothesized to be associated
with high credibility. The success and
failure cases were then compared in order
to test these nine hypotheses. The data for
each case were presented in the appendix
to Russett’s paper (p. 109).
Russett concluded that none of the nine
factors is a sufficient condition for high
credibility, and that the specified values of
variables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are not
necessary conditions for high credibility.
The crucial conclusions were that the nec-
essary conditions for high credibility are:
(a) equality of military strength between
D and A (on either variable 4 or 5), and
(b) presence of military and economic in-
terdependence between D and P (variables
7 and 9). This led to the following hy-
pothesis : &dquo;If other factors are equal, an
attacker will regard a military response by
the defender as more probable the greater
the number of military, political, and eco-
nomic ties between pawn and defender&dquo;
(p. 107). On the basis of these findings,
a practical recommendation was made, to
the effect that if the US wants to make
more credible its promise to defend third
areas, such as Europe, from Soviet attack,
it can do so by increasing its economic
dependence on those areas.
Credibility vs. Effectiveness
A crucial difficulty in Russett’s argument
arises from his use of the (observed) ef-
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fectiveness of D’s threat as a measure of its
(unobserved) credibility. This assumes
that in all cases of successful deterrence,
D’s threat was credible, and in all cases of
unsuccessful deterrence, D’s threat was not
credible. Unless this assumption is correct,
no valid inferences about the determinants
of high credibility can be drawn from the
data.
Clearly, the equation of effectiveness
and credibility is not simply a matter of
definition. Effectiveness is the behavioral
outcome of D’s threat, defined in terms of
A’s subsequent action toward P (attack or
no attack). Credibility, however, refers to
A’s cognitive reaction (belief or disbelief)
to D’s threat. Since these two variables are
not identical, there is no strictly logical
justification for assuming a one-to-one cor-
respondence between them.
One might rely on the empirical assump-
tion that in order to be effective, a threat
must be highly credible, i.e., that high
credibility of D’s threat is a necessary con-
dition for successful deterrence. If this is
true, then it is legitimate to infer from
observed success that the threat was be-
lieved by A. However, one cannot also
infer from observed failure that the threat
was not believed by A. This can be main-
tained only if high credibility is also a
suf ficient condition for success. In other
words, the general empirical assumption
required as justification for using success
and failure as an index of credibility is
that: &dquo;A believes D’s threat&dquo; is a necessary
and sufficient condition for &dquo;A does not
attack P.&dquo;
But this assumption, in unqualified form,
contradicts Russett’s explicit theory for pre-
dicting A’s response to the deterrent threat.
Using the probability-utility model which
is currently popular in the analysis of
national decision-making (cf. Snyder, 1960;
Singer, 1962), Russett specified four vari-
ables that jointly determine A’s behavior:
( 1 ) Va = the utility to A of an attack on P
which is not countered by D;
( 2 ) Vw = the utility to A of an attack on P
which is countered by D;
( 3 ) Vo = the utility to A of not attacking P
and consequently not being attacked by
D;
(4) s = A’s subjective probability that an at-
tack on P would not be countered by D.
The conditions under which D’s deterrent
threat will fail were then stated in the fol-
lowing formula:
Precisely, he (A) will press the attack only if:
Va(s) + Vw(1-s) > Vo [Russett, p. 107].
Va ( s ) represents the expected utility ( to
A) of an attack on P which is not countered
by D, while Vw ( 1- s ) represents the ex-
pected utility (to A) of an attack which is
countered by D. (It is important to note
that the term 1- s represents credibility, or
A’s subjective probability that D would
counter an attack on P.) The algebraic
sum of these two expected utility terms
represents the total expected utility of at-
tacking ( E Ua ) . Thus, the theory states
that A will attack P (and therefore, by
definition, D’s threat will fail) whenever
EUa > Vo. By implication, it also states
that A will not attack P (i.e., D’s threat
will succeed) whenever E Ua < Vo. Thus,
the statement that high credibility is a
necessary and sufficient condition for suc-
cess is equivalent to the statement that a
high value of 1- s (e.g., between 0.5 and
1.0) is a necessary and sufficient condition
for EUa < Vo. That this is false can be
shown by analysis of the formula.
First, note that the value of EUa must
always fall within the range defined by the
values of Va and Vw. This is so because
EUa is actually a weighted average of Va
and Vw, where the weights are provided
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by the complementary probabilities, s and
1- s. By formula, EUa = Va(s) + Vw(l - s).
If s = 1, then 1- s = 0, and EUa = Va. As
s decreases, 1- s increases, and the value
of EUa shifts proportionately, reaching the
arithmetic mean of Va and Vw when s =
0.5 = 1- s. As s decreases further, 1- s
increases further, and the value of EUa
moves closer and closer to the value of Vw,
until s = 0, 1- s =1, and E Ua = Vw.
Since EUa must fall between Va and
Vw for all values of 1- s, it follows that
EUa < Vo for any value of Vo which is
greater than both Va and Vw, regardless of
the value of 1- s. Therefore, no value of
1- s is a necessary condition for EUa < Vo.
Furthermore, EUa > Vo for any value of
Vo which is smaller than both Va and Vw,
regardless of the value of 1- s. Therefore,
no value of 1- s is a sufficient condition
for EUa < Vo. This implies that high cred-
ibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for
success, according to Russett’s own for-
mula. Therefore, his predictive model does
not justify the use of effectiveness as an
index of credibility.
However, the formula does allow us to
specify a set of conditions under which
high credibility will be both necessary and
sufficient for success. This will be the case
whenever Va > Vw and Vo = ~/2(Va + Vw).
Under these conditions, EUa will be less
than Vo if, and only if, credibility is high
( 1- s > 0.5). Since Vo falls exactly at the
midpoint between Va and Vw, E Ua can be
less than Vo only if Vw is weighted more
heavily than Va, and this can occur only if
s < 0.5 and 1- s > 0.5, since these are the
respective weights of Va and Vw. It can
easily be seen that if Vo is not equal to
the arithmetic mean of Va and Vw, then
the minimum value of 1- s that is required
in order to make EUa < Vo will be differ-
ent from 0.5. If Vo is greater than the
mean, then the minimum required value of
1- s is proportionately reduced, since E Ua
will not have to come as close to Vw in
order to be less than Vo. Conversely, if
Vo is less than the mean, then the mini-
mum required value of 1- s is proportion-
ately increased, since E Ua will have to
come closer to Vw in order to be less than
Vo. For example, consider all cases in
which Va = +1 and Vw = -1. If Vo = 0,
then any value of 1- s > 0.5 will lead to
EUa < Vo. But if Vo = -0.2, then any
value of 1-s > 0.6 will lead to EUa < Vo.
And if Vo = -0.5, then any value of 1- s >
0.75 will lead to EUa < Vo.
In general, for all values of Vo which
lie between Va and Vw, where Va > Vw,
the minimum magnitude of 1- s (degree
of credibility) which is required in order
to predict that A will not attack P (suc-
cessful detemence ) is directly proportional
to Va - Vo, or in other words, is inversely
proportional to Vo - Vw. Thus, as Vo
varies from Va to Vw, the minimum degree
of credibility which will be associated with
success varies from 0 to 1. If one does not
wish to define high credibility as 1- s >
0.5, it is possible to give a more general
rule. High credibility will be both neces-
sary and sufficient for successful deterrence
whenever: (a) Va > Vo > Vw, and (b)
high credibility is defined as any value of
1- s which is greater than (Va - Vo ) /
(Va-Vw). Under these conditions, if the
formula for predicting A’s behavior is true,
it is legitimate to infer from observed suc-
cess that D’s threat was credible, and to
infer from observed failure that D’s threat
was not credible.
The above analysis reveals the precise
points at which Russett’s study needs to be
strengthened. First, the meaning of high
credibility and low credibility needs to be
more clearly defined. This is essential if
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the inference from outcome to credibility
is to mean the same thing in each of the
17 empirical cases. But let us make the
reasonable assumption that the less exact
terms &dquo;likely&dquo; and &dquo;unlikely&dquo; imply a cut-
ting point somewhere near 1- s = 0.5.
Now, since credibility is only one detenni-
nant of behavioral outcome, one cannot
infer the degree of credibility directly from
outcome except under specified boundary
conditions. In order for success to be a
valid indicator of high credibility, and fail-
ure a valid indicator of low credibility, Va
must be greater than Vw, and Va - Vo
must equal approximately 1%2(Va - Vw), for
all observed cases. It is not necessary that
the absolute values of Va, Vo, and Vw be
identical across all 17 cases, but only that
their relative values be the same for all
cases. The critical weakness lies in the fact
that Russett presented no evidence or argu-
ment to support the assumption that, in
each case, Va - Vo = 1/2 ( Va - Vw) . If we
wish to accept this assumption, then we
can accept conclusions about credibility
based on observations of the effectiveness
of D’s threat. But if there is no reason to
accept this assumption, then there is no
reason to accept any conclusions about the
determinants of credibility.
Apparent vs. Actual Effectiveness
A second major difficulty arises from the
fact that effectiveness itself was not actu-
ally observed. In summarizing Russett’s
study, I stated that he defined success as
the behavioral outcome &dquo;A does not attack
P,&dquo; and failure as the outcome &dquo;A attacks
P.&dquo; Strictly speaking, this was an oversim-
plification. Russett’s explicit definition of
success was &dquo;an instance when an attack
on the pawn is prevented or repulsed with-
out conflict between the attacking forces
and regular combat units of the major
power ‘defender’ &dquo; ( p. 98). The crucial
element in this definition is that D’s threat
prevents A from attacking P. But preven-
tion implies more than the simple observa-
tion that A does not attack; it also implies
that D’s threat is crucial in producing that
outcome, i.e., that the threat was an effec-
tive inhibitor of an action that otherwise
would have occurred. According to this
meaning of effectiveness, D’s threat can be
considered successful only if: (a) in the
absence of the threat, A would have at-
tacked P; (b) nothing else besides D’s
threat acted as an effective deterrent; and
( c ) A did not attack P. If A would not
have attacked anyway, then the same be-
havioral outcome only gives the illusion
that D’s threat was effective; this case can
be called apparent effectiveness. Unless
both conditions a and b can be assumed to
hold, then conclusions about the determi-
nants of actual effectiveness cannot confi-
dently be derived from the data.
The crucial assumption is that in the ab-
sence of D’s threat (or some other deter-
rent factor), A would have attacked P.
This was assumed to be true for each of
the six &dquo;success&dquo; cases. Apparently, the
only basis for this assumption is the fact
that in each case, A had threatened to at-
tack P. But to infer from A’s threat that A
will attack P unless prevented by some
deterrent is to attribute perfect credibility
to A’s threat. One cannot ignore the possi-
bility that A might threaten P, not because
A actually intends to attack P, but rather
as a means to some other end. For exam-
ple, it might be simply a tactical move on
the part of A in order to distract D’s atten-
tion, or in order to win a concession on
some other point. Possibly the only factor
which is needed in order to differentiate
the &dquo;success&dquo; and failure cases is that in
the former, A did not intend to attack P,
while in the latter, A did intend to attack.
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Even if it is granted that A would have
attacked, it still must be shown that it was
D’s deterrent threat and not some other
input which made the difference. Suppose,
for example, that D’s deterrent threat was
only one of several world social forces that
were brought to bear on A in response to
A’s threat to attack P. Various countries,
international organizations, or even fac-
tions within A may have tried, by various
means (including threats of nonmilitary
retaliation, promises, and suasion), to de-
ter A from such aggression. The total pat-
tern of such forces might have to be con-
sidered the effective deterrent in this case,
and it is conceivable that D’s threat alone
would not have been sufficient. The impli-
cation of the above argument is that be-
fore one can accept Russett’s data as evi-
dence regarding the determinants of threat
effectiveness, evidence must be obtained
on the six &dquo;success&dquo; cases to show that they
are in fact cases of actual success.
Alternative Interpretations of the Data
If the preceding arguments are correct,
it follows that Russett’s data can, by them-
selves, tell us nothing about the determi-
nants of either the credibility or the effec-
tiveness of D’s deterrent threat. However,
the data are not meaningless, since the
observed dependent variable is itself inter-
esting. There were, in fact, two different
behavioral outcomes (attack vs. no attack)
within the set of 17 deterrence situations
studied. If one admits the possibility that
D’s threat had little or no causal relevance
to the outcome, then the data can be re-
examined in an effort to develop hypoth-
eses about the determinants of A’s final
response.
To facilitate the analysis, the findings
can be summarized by means of a series of
2 X 2 contingency tables. This can be
done readily from Russett’s appendix (p.
109), since all variables there were dichot-
omized. Table 1 shows the number of
&dquo;attack&dquo; (failure) cases and the number of
&dquo;no attack&dquo; (success) cases for each value
of the nine independent variables. To pro-
vide a rough measure of the degree of
association between the independent vari-
ables and behavioral outcome, phi coeffi-
cients have been computed, and the vari-
ables are listed in descending order accord-
ing to their corresponding phi values.
One may have some reservations about
applying a statistical test to these data, on
grounds that historical connections among
many of the cases contradict the assump-
tions of independence required by the test.
For example, three of the &dquo;success&dquo; cases
involved the US in the role of defender
against the USSR, all within a two-year
period; and four of the failure cases in-
volved Great Britain and France in the
role of defender against Germany, again
within a two-year period. It can be argued
that these seven cases are not really seven
independent cases, but rather only two,
and that the sample is therefore artificially
inflated from the point of view of statistical
inference. However, the effect of reducing
sample size would be to reduce the degree
of confidence one could have that any of
the correlations are different from zero.
Recognizing that the purpose of the pres-
ent analysis is not to test hypotheses, but
rather to suggest them, it does not seem
necessary to apply the most rigorous sta-
tistical criteria. Thus, for each 2 X 2 table,
the chance probability of obtaining the
given array of data (or a more extreme
array) has been computed by means of
Fisher’s exact test, simply as a basis for
comparing the obtained correlations.
Among the nine independent variables,
economic interdependence between D and
P is most highly associated with outcome.
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TABLE 1
BEHAVIORAL OUTCOME OF 17 DETERRENCE SITUATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF NINE SITUATIONAL
VARIABLES
On the basis of this finding, Russett argued
that the credibility of D’s threat is posi-
tively associated with D-P interdepen-
dence. But the obtained correlation can be
interpreted in quite a different way. Per-
haps in most cases A threatened to attack
a pawn which was known to be important
to D in order to harass D and perhaps win
some other point in another arena of A-D
interaction. If so, then A’s threat and D’s
deterrent threat set up an apparent deter-
rence situation, which was bound to result
in no attack becase A had no intention of
doing so. Thus, D-P economic interde-
pendence may be associated with no at-
tack, not because it influenced A’s decision
about attacking following D’s threat, but
rather because it influenced A’s decision to
make a false threat against P prior to D’s
deterrent threat.
Although military cooperation between
D and P was more weakly associated with
outcome, it was nevertheless present in all
cases of no attack. This may be accounted
for in the same way as the previous corre-
lation. The fact that D sent arms and
advisers to P may have been treated by A
as evidence that D was interested enough
in P to be affected by a threat against P.
This objective fact of D-P cooperation may
have been the trigger for a false threat by
A rather than a cue enhancing the credi-
bility and effectiveness of D’s deterrent
threat. This same line of argument is con-
sistent with the fact that the relative mili-
tary strength of A and D was not associ-
ated with outcome: if A did not really
intend to attack P, then it would not be
necessary for D to be militarily superior to
A in order for the outcome to be &dquo;no at-
tack.&dquo;
It is more difficult to account for the
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TABLE 2
BEHAVIORAL OUTCOME OF 17 DETERRENCE
SITUATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF DATE OF
OCCURRENCE OF THE CRISIS
unexpected finding that the relative size of
P and D was negatively correlated with
outcome. Neither the &dquo;credibility&dquo; inter-
pretation nor the &dquo;false threat by A&dquo; inter-
pretation is consistent with this result, since
a P that is relatively unimportant should
neither be selected as a special target by
A nor produce a highly credible threat by
D. Perhaps this merely reflects the fact
that the size of P relative to the defender
does not function as a sign of the impor-
tance of P in D’s value hierarchy. But if
this is true, why shouldn’t the correlation
be near zero rather than near -0.50P One
answer might be that the sample is so
small that one cannot attribute much sig-
nificance to the obtained correlation. How-
ever, this would remove the necessity for
interpreting any of the obtained correla-
tions, since the statistical significance level
obtained by Fisher’s exact test is 0.075 for
both the most positive and the most nega-
tive correlations in the table. A second
possible answer is that the P/D ratio varies
mainly because of variations in the size of
D rather than because of variation in the
size of P. A glance at Russett’s list of cases
(1963, p. 99) shows that in all six &dquo;success&dquo;
(no attack) cases, D was either the US or
the USSR, which are much larger than
other major powers, while in the failure
(attack) cases, more than half involved
Great Britain and France as defenders.
When D is very large, P is more likely to
be relatively small. This difference alone
can account for the obtained negative cor-
relation between relative size of P and
behavioral outcome.
Differences in the size of D are coupled
to another fact which may be of signifi-
cance. One can also see from Russett’s list
of cases that all of the &dquo;no attack&dquo; out-
comes occurred during the post-World War
II era, while most of the &dquo;attack&dquo; outcomes
occurred prior to the war. Table 2 shows
the relationship between behavioral out-
come and date of occurrence of the crisis.
The striking fact about these data is that
the historical period is as strongly associ-
ated with outcome as is D-P economic
interdependence. But the correlation be-
tween date and outcome permits an en-
tirely different interpretation. It is con-
ceivable that a crucial change has taken
place in the total international situation,
sharply increasing the total pattern of de-
terrent pressures which can be brought
to bear on a potential attacker. Perhaps
the focusing of world political pressures
through the United Nations exerts a great
restraining force, a general downward pres-
sure on EUa, even without explicit deter-
rent threats by D. It is quite plausible that
such extra pressures were far weaker dur-
ing the prewar period, so that the total
deterrent environment has changed. Under
this interpretation, the association between
outcome and D-P economic or military
interdependence may be merely a reflec-
tion of the fact that the postwar policies of
both the US and the USSR have led to an
increase in the number of satellites for
each. In this case, P-D interdependence
can be seen as a cause for D’s deterrent
threat, but as causally irrelevant to the
behavioral outcome.
A different mode of analysis of the
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data, which Russett apparently used in
arriving at several of his conclusions, is to
look for factors which may be necessary
conditions for the occurrence of the pre-
ferred outcome (no attack). Since a nec-
essary condition is one which must be
present in order for the desired event to
take place, it follows that in order to claim
that a factor may be necessary, it must be
present in all cases with that outcome.
From Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that
the following conditions were present in
all six cases where the outcome was &dquo;no
attack&dquo;: (1) there was military coopera-
tion between D and P; (2) D did not pos-
sess local military superiority over A; (3)
the population ratio of P/D was less than
20 percent; (4) the GNP ratio of P/D was
less than 5 percent; (5) the crisis occurred
after 1945. It is also true, although not
shown in these tables, that in each case:
(6) D was either the US or the USSR;
(7) D possessed nuclear weapons at the
time of the crisis.
Thus it is possible that any one of these
conditions, or any combination of two or
more of them, is a necessary condition for
the outcome to be &dquo;no attack.&dquo; There are
probably many other factors which were
also present in each of these cases, so that
a decision as to which, if any, are neces-
sary to the outcome is not possible on the
basis of the limited data which have been
presented.
Implications for Further Research
The alternative interpretations which I
have given for Russett’s data reflect a the-
oretical approach to the study of deter-
rence which is generally similar to his. The
differences seem to lie mainly in which
factual assumptions we are willing to make
or which potentially relevant variables we
are willing to ignore for purposes of a par-
ticular study. Thus, the general theory
which we both use postulates that if there
are factors motivating A to attack P, then
some inhibiting factors must be present in
order to prevent that attack. Russett’s
study concentrated on a specific subset of
all possible inhibiting factors, while assum-
ing that other inhibiting factors as well as
the motivating factors were constant or
else could be ignored. My thesis is simply
that greater attention must be paid to the
latter two sets of factors if valid conclu-
sions are to be drawn about the first set.
The model I have been using predicts
behavioral outcome from the relative
strength of two motives: A’s motive to at-
tack P ( Ma ) and A’s motive not to attack
P (Mo). It states that A will attack if
Ma - Mo > 0, and that A will not attack
if Ma - Mo < 0. Further, Mo is broken
down into at least two components: the
motivation not to attack which arises from
D’s deterrent threat (Dd), and the motiva-
tion not to attack which arises from other
deterrent factors ( Od ) . Mo = Dd + Od.
Thus, A will attack if Ma - Dd - Od > 0,
but will not attack if Ma - Dd - Od < 0.
The magnitude of Dd will make a differ-
ence to the outcome only if Ma - Od > 0,
because the predicted outcome will always
be &dquo;no attack&dquo; when Ma - Od < 0.
The &dquo;other inhibiting factors&dquo; which
contribute to the strength of Od need not
be restricted to threats of military retalia-
tion by nations other than D. It is possible
to broaden the concept of deterrence to
include other methods of influencing A,
such as threats of economic retaliation or
promises (by D or by other nations) of
reward for doing something else (cf. Mil-
bum, 1959, p. 139). In addition, inhib-
iting factors need not all arise in A’s social
environment, but may come partly from
politically active groups within A. Thus,
one may consider both negative and posi-
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tive pressures against attacking, arising
from various sources.
Future empirical research on the deter-
minants of effective deterrence must deal
explicitly with these various classes of vari-
ables, since it cannot be assumed a priori
that they are negligible in any historical
case. If the problem is to determine whether
some particular variable influences the mag-
nitude of Dd, and if the behavioral outcome
of the deterrence situation is to be used as
an index of the magnitude of Dd, then
ideally the cases would be selected so that
they all have the same magnitude, greater
than zero, of Ma - Od. If it is not possible
to find a sufficient number of such cases on
record, then it may be possible to do the
next best thing, which is to measure the
strengths of the various component motiva-
tional forces and make empirical predictions
by plugging the obtained values into one
or more predictive formulas in order to see
whether predictions are improved by in-
cluding the variable in question. If the
problem of measuring the motivational
forces appears insurmountable for the pres-
ent, it may be necessary to give up the mo-
tivational model as a basis for designing the
study, or even to redefine the problem.
One approach which does not depend so
directly on the motivational model starts
with the postulate that the behavioral out-
come of the deterrence situation is deter-
mined by the total pattern of communica-
tive influence attempts (threats, promises,
and suasion) directed at A’s decision-makers
after A threatened to attack P. It can be
assumed that some of these messages will
be favorable to the attack, and that others
will oppose it; it can also be assumed that
some countries will not attempt to influence
A in a particular case, thus by default com-
municating permissiveness. It can also be
assumed that the impact of each message
will be a function of the power of its send-
er ; thus each message can be weighted ac-
cording to some index of the sender’s power,
and a weighted sum of favorable, unfavor-
able, and permissive messages can be ob-
tained. A’s response can be predicted from
the ratio of the total strength of unfavorable
messages to the total strength of favorable
messages, perhaps modified by the total
amount of permissiveness present in the
situation. The link between these factors
and the motivational model is contained in
the assumption that Mo is positively cor-
related with the total strength of unfavor-
able messages, and that Me is increased by
the occurrence of favorable messages and
perhaps by the presence of permissiveness.
Whether it is easier to gather data on the
matrix of influence attempts impinging on
A, or directly on the motivational state of
A, will have to be answered in the process
of trying to gather both kinds of data.
An important implication of the present
discussion is this: the question of whether
deterrent threats of military retaliation are
ever effective in preventing aggression is
prior to the question of what determines the
effectiveness of such threats. Can one find
evidence to refute the null hypothesis that
the incidence of military attacks by one
nation on another, following a threat by the
attacker, is the same whether or not a de-
terrent threat is made? Perhaps this hy-
pothesis can be tested by broadening the
empirical base beyond deterrence situations
involving only the defense of small third
parties by large defenders against large at-
tackers. By including self-defense situations
as well, and by taking all cases regardless of
the size of the principal participant nations,
a much larger sample of deterrence situa-
tions can be obtained. With a larger sam-
ple, the chances will be greater of finding
cases in which there was no deterrent threat
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(remember that there apparently was such
a threat in every case in Russett’s sample);
unless such cases can be found, it will not
be possible to test the hypothesis in question.
Russett’s study was an effort to apply
ex post f acto experimental logic to the em-
pirical investigation of deterrence. I have
tried to show some of the difficulties en-
countered in such studies. But despite these
difficulties, I believe that this kind of sys-
tematic analysis of historical cases can lead
to an advance in knowledge about interna-
tional relations. If nothing more, it can at
least help clarify the nature of and the rea-
sons for our ignorance of general laws gov-
erning the behavior of nations.
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